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Cases 
(1) Commonwealth V. Moreiva388 MASS.600, 447NJE.2d 1224, 1228 (1983) 9 
"A person may not use force to resist an illegal arrest unless the officer uses excessive 
force". 
(2) Elson V. State, 659 p. 2d at 1200 N. 18; Elson V. State, 659 p. 2d 1195 
(Alaska 1983) 9 
"The rule adapted barring the use of force to appose a search (arrest) does not apply 
where the officer uses excessive or unnecessary force in conducting the search (arrest)55 
1195 "combines or extends arrests and/to searches". 
(3) Gray V. State, 463 p. 2d 897, 908 (Alaska 1970) 9 
"Excessive or unnecessary force in conducting a search (arrest)55. 
"In instances where the officer uses excessive force in effecting a search (arrest), the 
defendant must have the legal right to defend against that excessive force55. 
(4) Miranda V.Arizona 384 U.S. 491 10,11,18,19 
"Where rights secured by the constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or 
legislation which would abrogate the right55. 
(5) State V. Gardiner No. 880557 (Utahct. app. 1989) 17,18 
"The Court of Appeals held that one may not resist a search (arrest) by an officer, even if 
illegal, unless [the] defendant can show that the officer was not... acting pursuant to his 
[or her] authority, or had used excessive force55. 
(6) State V. Hay 859 p. 2d 1.7 (Utah 1993) 15,17 
"[T]he prosecution's responsibility is that of a minister of justice and not simply that of 
an advocate; which includes a duty to see that the defendant is accorded procedural 
justice and not that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. A criminal trial 
is more than a contest between the prosecution and the defense; it is a search for truth5 *» 
m 
(7) Margulies V. Upchurch 696 p. 2d 1195 (Utah 1985) 16, 22 
(8) John Bad Elk V. U.S.177, 529 9, 19 
"For an officer, being-killed in the course of a disorder, accompanying an arrest met with 
resistance, the law looks with different eyes upon the transaction, of an officer with the 
authority of making the arrest, than for an officer without the authority; in the former, the 
result could be murder, but, in the latter, could be nothing but manslaughter, or the facts 
could show the non-commitment of an offence". 
(9) State V. Nickles 728 p. 2d 123.131 (Utah 1986) 14,17 
"It is clear that a prosecutor should be disqualified on a timely motion when he has a 
personal conflicting interest in the case". 
(10) Plummer V. State 136 Ind. 306 9, 19 
"In the course of a without law-arrest, an individual may resist up-to and including the 
taking of the life of an officer attempting the arrest". 
(ll)RunyonV. State 57 Ind. 80 9,19 
"For an individual, without fault, in a place the individual has a right of being, is 
assaulted with threats and violence, the individual can, without a retreat, repel by force, 
and, if in the reasonable exercise of the inalienable right of self defense, the assailant is 
killed, the individual is justified. The principles above apply in the case of a peace-
officer, in making an attempted arrest, and, abuses the authority, and transcends the 
bounds of, by the use of [unnecessary-deadly] force and violence, as with an individual-
citizen in use of the [unnecessary-deadly] force and violence". 
(12) United - States V. Musser 7 p. 389 15 
IV 
BRIEF 
III-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
JUDICIAL CODE 
UNDER THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 78-2a-3(2) (F) THE COURT OF 
APPEALS HAS JURISDICTION OVER AN APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT, 
ON AN ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS. 
IV-STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
(A) ON THE 9T H SEPTEMBER 1999, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 60 PLUS 
MILES FROM A TOWN, WITHOUT A WARRANT, WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY, 
WITHOUT JURISDICTION, THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS SHOT AT WHILE 
IN A PICKUP TRUCK, HAD A POLICE ATTACK DOG TURNED LOOSE ON,WITH 
A THREAT UPON THE LIFE OF THE PETITIONER/APPEALLANT, AND WITHOUT 
DELAY THE SHOW OF [DEAD[LY]] FORCE IN CARRYING OUT THE THREAT, 
BY THE DEPUTY John Cambers, OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SHERIFF OF THE 
COUNTY OF BEAVER, Utah-STATE. 
(B) AT THE TRIAL THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF CLAIMING SELF-DEFENSE AS A DEFENCE, 
BY THE JUDGE, Kay L. Mclff. 
(C) AT THE TRIAL THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT SUFFERED THE LOSS 
OF FREEDOM, REPUTATION AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE, BY THE 
UNTRUTHS THAT WAS IN THE TESTIMONY OF THE ASSAILANT OFFICER OF 
THE PEACE, John Chambers, THE SHERIFF Kenneth Yardley, AND RELIED UPON 
1 
IN THE DECISION MADE ON THE DIRECT APPEAL, CASE # 200000465-SC, BY 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE. 
(D) THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT A TRIAL IN FAIRNESS, 
CASE # 991500129, BECAUSE THE JUDGE Kay L. Mclff, AND THE SPECIAL 
PROSECUTOR, Scott Burns, WERE RESPONDENTS IN A CIVIL CASE # 2000-CV-
001 ST., FOR THE TITLE 18 U.S.C. § 4, "MISPRISION OF FELONY", FOR THE 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT BY THE ASSAILANT OFFICER OF THE PEACE , John 
Chambers, AND THE LACK OF RESPONSE AFTER THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
(EXHIBIT (A)); FILED IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT ON THE 3R D DAY OF 
JANUARY, 2000, BY THE PETITIONER/ APPELLANT. 
V-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES OF THE STATE, 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL. 
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE United-STATES 
ARTICLE VI CLAUSE 2 
This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance 
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Bill of Rights, AMENDMENT 4 
Search and Arrest Warrants 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized". 
2 
Bill of Rights, AMENDMENT 6 
Rights of an Accused Person 
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial 
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense". 
CONSTITUTION OF THE Utah-STATE 
ARTICLE 1 SECTION 1 
ALL MEN HAVE THE INHERENT AND INALIENABLE RIGHT TO ENJOY AND 
DEFEND THEIR LIVES AND LIBERTIES: 
ARTICLE 1 SECTION 14 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized". 
APPLICABLE STATUTES: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402. Force in defense of person - Forcible felony defined. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the 
extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a third 
person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, that person is 
justified in using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury only if he 
or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury 
to himself or a third person as a result of the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to 
prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified in Subsection 
(1) if he or she: 
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* * * * 
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted 
commission of a felony; or 
* * * * 
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of fact may 
consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors: 
(a) the nature of the danger; 
(b) the immediacy of the danger; 
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily 
injury[.] 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-403 Force in arrest. 
Any person is justified in using any force, except deadly force, which he reasonably 
believes to be necessary to effect an arrest or to defend himself or another from bodily 
harm while making an arrest. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404 Peace officer's use of deadly force: 
(1) A peace officer, or any person acting by his command in his aid and assistance, is 
justified in using deadly force when: 
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to an in accordance with the judgment of a 
competent court in executing a penalty of death; 
(b) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape from custody following an arrest, 
where the officer reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to prevent the arrest 
from being defeated by escape; and 
(i) the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a 
felony offense involving the infliction of death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of 
death or serious bodily injury to the officer or to others if apprehension is delayed; 
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to 
prevent death or serious bodily injury to the officer or another person. 
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by the officer prior to any use of deadly 
force under Subsection (l)(b) or (l)(c). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102 Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
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(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily injury to 
another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to 
another. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103. Aggravated Assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-
102andhe: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) (a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) (b) is a third degree felony. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-7Force in making arrest: 
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcibly resists after being informed of the 
intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use reasonable force to effect an 
arrest. Deadly force may be used only as provided in Section 76-2-404. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 
Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect - Grounds: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
VI-FACTS OF THE CASE 
ON THE 1ST APRIL, 2000, THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT, Tony-Alexander: 
Hamilton., CASE #991500129 WAS FOUND GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED 
AGGRAVATED MURDER, A 1ST DEGREE FELONY, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A 
3RD DEGREE FELONY, MURDER OF A SERVICE DOG, A CLASS A 
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MISDEMEANOR, INTERFERENCE WITH AN ARRESTING OFFICER, A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR, AND CRIMINAL TRESSPASS, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, BY 
A 6TH DISTRICT JUDGE, Kay L. Mclff, IN THE 6TH DISTRICT CITY OF RICHFIELD, 
FOR THE 5TH DISTRICT, COUNTY OF BEAVER, OF THE UTAH - STATE. [THE 
CHANGE OF VENUE WAS FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF THE STATE IN 
OBTAINING A VERDICT OF GUILTY BY THE JURY.] 
WITH THE TRIAL BEING THE AFTERMATH OF A CONTESTED PARCEL 
OF THE EARTH, SECTION 16, TOWNSHIP 28 SOUTH, RANGE 18 WEST, SALT -
LAKE - BASE AND MERIDIAN, KNOWN AS VANCE SPRING, THAT ISSUE WILL 
NOT BE PART OF THIS CASE. 
VII-ARGUEMENT 
ISSUE (A) 
ON THE 9 SEPTEMBER, 1999, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY, WITHOUT A 
WARRANT, WITHOUT AUTHORITY, UTAH CODE ANNOTATION § 77-7-15; THE 
OFFICER HAS AUTHORITY IN A "PUBLIC PLACE," BUT IS WITHOUT 
AUTHORITY, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY WITHOUT A WARRANT, "SUPPORTED 
BY OATH OR AFFIRMATION"; Bill of Rights AMENDMENT 4 CONSTITUTION 
FOR THE United-STATES, UTAH-STATE CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1 SECTION 1 
AND 14. 
ON THE DATE ABOVE THE SHERIFF AND THREE DEPUTIES, WITHOUT A 
WARRANT, ENTERED UPON THE ABOVE DESCRIBED PROPERTY. THE 
SHERIFF AND TWO DEPUTIES ENTERED ON THE EAST SIDE AND WALKED IN. 
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UPON SEEING THE THREE OFFICERS OF THE PEACE WHILE DRIVING A 
PICKUP, THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT STOPPED AND TURNED TOWARD THE 
OFFICERS, WHEN ONE OF THE OFFICERS DARTED INTO THE TREES. NOT 
WANTING A PART IN AN AMBUSH, THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT TURNED 
AROUND AND DROVE INTO A CLEARED AREA AND PROCEEDED IN DIGGING 
SOME WEEDS. AFTER 5-10 MINUTES, THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
NOTICED A FOURTH OFFICER WITH A DOG ON A LEASH WALKING TOWARD 
THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT, WHO STOPPED DIGGING WEEDS AND DROVE 
WITHIN 15-20 FEET OF THE OFFICER OF THE PEACE (ADDENDUM 0001) 
WITH A DOG ON A LEASH, AND ASKED, "DO YOU HAVE A WARRANT, John?" 
AT THAT TIME THE OFFICER STARTED TOWARD THE TRUCK WITH A 
HAND ON A WEAPON AND A DOG JUMPING AT A LEASH. WITHOUT A 
DESIRE FOR A CONFRONTATION WITH AN OFFICER OF THE PEACE WITH HIS 
HAND ON A WEAPON AND A DOG JUMPING AT A LEASH, THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT PUSHED ON THE THROTTLE AND SPED IN A 
NORTH-WEST DIRECTION, 180° AWAY FROM THE ROCK HOUSE, (PAGE 191 OF 
EXHIBIT "A" LINE12 THROUGH 15). 
WITHIN TWO SECONDS THE OFFICER OF THE PEACE TURNED INTO AN 
ASSAILANT, SHOOTING AT THE TRUCK, WITH THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
INSIDE OF THE TRUCK, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-2-
403, § 76-2-404. 
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AFTER THE OFFICER OF THE PEACE (ASSAILANT) HAD FIRED THE 5 m 
OR 6T H SHOT (0002), HITTING THE 2 N D TIRE ON THE DRIVERS SIDE, THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT TURNED THE TRUCK IN A HALF CIRCLE, 180° AND 
DROVE BACK INTO THE AREA WHERE THE ASSAILANT OFFICER WAS FIRST 
SEEN, AND NOT WANTING THE WHEELS RUINED, STOPPED THE TRUCK. 
UPON EXITING THE TRUCK TO ASSESS THE DAMAGES, OBSERVED THE 
ASSAILANT OFFICER TAKING THE LEASH OFF OF THE DOG. WITHOUT A 
DESIRE OF BEING CHEWED ON BY A POLICE ATTACK DOG, FOR 
PROTECTION OF SELF (CONSTITUTION FOR THE United-STATES, Bill of Rights 
AMENDMENT 4, Utah-STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1 SECTION 1, ARTICLE 
1 SECTION 14), TOOK A .223 RIFLE FROM THE TRUCK. IN OBSERVING THE 
DOG, THE DOG RAN INTO THE POND OF WATER AND GOT A DRINK. UPON 
EXITING THE POND THE DOG WAS YELLED AT BY THE ASSAILANT OFFICER. 
WITHOUT ANY TRUST IN THE OFFICER OF THE PEACE, AFTER BEING SHOT 
AT IN THE TRUCK, TWO ROUNDS WERE FIRED AT THE DOG, MISSING ON THE 
FIRST SHOT. AFTER THE SECOND SHOT THE DOG ROLLED OVER ONCE OR 
TWICE AND LAY ON THE GROUND. 
AT THAT TIME THE ASSAILANT OFFICER YELLED AND SAID, "YOU 
MOTHER FUCKER, YOU KILLED MY DOG, YOU'RE A DEAD MAN, Tony." 
(PAGE 162, EXHIBIT A OF THE WRIT.) WITHIN A SECOND A BARRAGE OF 
BULLETS STARTED HITTING THE TRUCK, FORCING THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT INTO TAKING COVER BEHIND THE FRONT WHEEL 
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OF THE PICKUP. AFTER THE 51H OR 61H ROUND, THE DEPUTY WAS 
OBSERVED PUTTING A SECOND CLIP INTO THE WEAPON, AND THAT CLIP 
WAS EMPTIED. THE THIRD CLIP WAS PUT INTO THE WEAPON AND THE 
ASSAILANT OFFICER STARTED WALKING TOWARD THE AREA WHERE THE 
DOG HAD FALLEN, AND HAD THE ASSAILANT OFFICER REACHED THE AREA, 
THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WOULD HAVE BEEN WITHOUT ANY 
PROTECTION FROM THE ASSAULT. (UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-5-102 
AND § 76-5-103. 
AT THAT TIME THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT A TRUST 
IN THE OFFICERS OF THE PEACE, AND CONSIDERING THE EVENT A SECOND 
"RUBY RIDGE" (IN THE Idaho - STATE), OR A SECOND "WACO" (IN THE Texas -
STATE), AND WITHOUT A KNOWLEDGE OF THE LOCATION OF THE THREE 
OFFICERS OF THE PEACE SEEN BEFORE, TWO SHOTS WERE FIRED IN FRONT 
OF THE ASSAILANT OFFICER, AND SOME WORDS WERE YELLED BY THE 
ASSAILANT. WITH THE FORWARD MOTION OF THE ASSAILANT TOWARD 
THE AREA THAT THE DOG HAD FALLEN, IN THE FEAR FOR THE LIFE, THE 
LEG OF THE ASSAILANT WAS PICKED OUT AND SHOT, BY THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT. Commonwealth V. Moreiva 388 MASS.600, 447 N.E.2d 
1224, 1228 (1983), Elson V. State, 659 p. 2d at 1200 N. 18; Elson V. State, 659 p. 2d 
1195, Gray V. State, 463 p. 2d 897, 908 (Alaska 1970), John Bad Elk V. U.S.177, 529, 
Plummer V. State 136 Ind. 306, Runyon V. State 57 Ind. 80. 
9 
IN THE MIND OF THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT, AFTER BEING SHOT AT 
20 PLUS TIMES (TWO ELEVEN ROUND CLIPS), AFTER SHOOTING THE DOG 
AND THE ASSAILANT OFFICER IN DEFENSE OF SELF (CONSTITUTION FOR 
THE United-STATES Bill of Rights AMENDMENT 4, CONSTITUTION FOR THE 
Utah-STATE ARTICLE 1 SECTION 1, ARTICLE 1 SECTION 14), Miranda V. Arizona 
384 U.S. 491, AND EXPECTING THE THREE OFFICERS SEEN BEFORE [TO] 
RETALIATE, THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT LOCATED TWO MORE CLIPS OF 
AMMUNITION IN THE TOOL BOX ON THE TRUCK, AND STARTED WALKING 
OUT OF THE AREA. 
WITHIN A COUPLE OF MINUTES THE SHERIFF, Ken Yardley CAME 
WALKING OUT OF THE TREES AND YELLED, "IS THAT YOU, Tony?" THE 
ANSWER WAS, "YES Ken, DO YOU HAVE A WARRANT?" THE ANSWER WAS, 
"NO." THE NEXT WORD FROM THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS, "THAT 
HAS BEEN THE PROBLEM ALL ALONG. WHY DO YOU INSIST ON VIOLATING 
THE LAW?" 
IN THE PROCESS OF THE CONVERSATION, WITHOUT A TRUST IN THE 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, TWICE THE SHERIFF BEGIN CLOSING THE DISTANCE 
BETWEEN THE SHERIFF AND THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT (PROBLEM OF 
HEARING), AND TWICE, WITHOUT A TRUST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AFTER 
BEING SHOT AT 20 PLUS TIMES BY THE ASSAILANT OFFICER OF THE PEACE, 
WITH THE RIFLE LEANED OVER THE FENCE, POINTING IN THE AIR ABOVE 
THE SHERIFF, (EXHIBIT "A", PAGE 130, LINE 22 THRU LINE 16 PAGE 131), THE 
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SHERIFF WAS TOLD "THAT'S CLOSE ENOUGH," BY THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT. 
AFTER 10-15 MINUTES CONVERSING WITH THE SHERIFF, THE 
DEPUTY, James White, WITH THE HANDS IN THE AIR, STARTED WALKING OUT 
OF THE TREES AND JOINED IN THE CONVERSATION. IN THE COURSE OF THE 
CONVERSATION THE SHERIFF WAS TOLD, "YOU HAD BETTER GO TO TOWN, 
CONVENE A GRAND JURY AND COME BACK WITH A WARRANT." 
WITHIN HALF AN HOUR THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS SUBDUED 
AND ARRESTED BY THE SHERIFF, Ken Yardley AND THE DEPUTY James white. 
ISSUE (B) 
AT THE TRIAL, PRESIDED OVER BY THE JUDGE Kay L. Mclff, THE 
COURT DID DEPRIVE THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT THE RIGHT OF CLAMING 
SELF-DEFENSE AS A DEFENCE, AGAINST THE THREAT OF LIFE AND THE USE 
OF DEAD[LY] FORCE IN CARRYING OUT THE THREAT. [WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS, EXHIBIT "C" PAGE 2, ARTICLE 1, SECOND PARAGRAPH], [A RULING, 
PROBABLY MADE THE FIRST HOUR, IN THE JUDGE'S CHAMBERS.] 
IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Bill of Rights 
AMENDMENT 4, AND Bill of Rights AMENDMENT 6, ALONG WITH THE 
CONSTITUTION FOR THE Utah-STATE; ARTICLE 1 SECTION 1, AND ARTICLE 1 
SECTION 14, THE GOD GIVEN RIGHTS INHERENT AND INALIENABLE ARE 
GUARANTEED BY BOTH CONSTITUTIONS. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 384 US 419; 
"WHERE THE RIGHTS SECURED BY THE CONSTITUTION ARE INVOLVED, 
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THERE CAN BE NO RULE MAKING OR LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD 
ABROGATE THE RIGHT". 
ISSUE (C) 
AT THE TRIAL THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT SUFFERED THE LOSE OF 
FREEDOM, REPUTATION AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE, BY THE 
UNTRUTHS THAT WERE PUT ON THE RECORD, BY THE ASSAILANT OFFICER 
OF THE PEACE, DEPUTY John Chambers AND THE SHERIFF Kenneth Yardley, AND 
RELIED UPON IN THE DIRECT APPEAL, CASE #200000465 - SC (EXHIBIT "D" OF 
THE WRIT), BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE. 
ON PAGE 185 OF THE (EXHIBIT "A"), LINE 8, QUOTE, "Tony DROVE UP 
TO WITHIN ABOUT EIGHT FEET OF ME...." LINE 14, SAID, "THAT'S FAR 
ENOUGH CHAMBERS,".... LINE 23, "THEN CONTINUED TO DRIVE PAST ME." 
IN THE ADDENDUM (0001), AN ACCOUNT GIVEN BY THE DEPUTY John 
Chambers TEN DAYS AFTER THE INCIDENT, "THE PICKUP GOT WITHIN 15-20 
FT. OF HIM",... "TONY STATED, THAT'S FAR ENOUGH CHAMBERS, THEN 
SPED UP AND TURNED AROUND". 
IN REALITY, THE FACT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRUCK IS PAST THE 
ASSAILANT, DEPUTY, John Chambers, AND THE ACCOUNT GIVEN, LINE 21 
PAGE 187 OF EXHIBIT "A", THRU LINE 8 PAGE 189, IS AN IMPOSSIBILITY. 
IN THE ACCOUNT GIVEN, (0001), 4TH PARAGRAPH, QUOTE, "Chambers 
STATED AS HE WAS MOVING TOWARD Tony AND THE PICKUP, THERE WERE 
TWO OR THREE SHOTS FIRED IN HIS DIRECTION BY Tony, THAT HE SAW 
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DUST HIT BEHIND HIM AND TO HIS RIGHT." IF A MAN WAS SHOOTING AT 
YOU, WOULD YOU NOT BE LOOKING TOWARD THE SHOOTER, INSTEAD OF 
BEHIND YOU, WHILE MOVING TOWARD THE SHOOTER? 
ON PAGE 194 OF (EXHIBIT "A"), LINE 2, THE DEPUTY CHANGED THE 
SEQUENCE OF THE SHOOTING: "IMMEDIATELY AFTER HE HIT MAX, HE 
FIRED TWO ROUNDS AT ME." 
ON THE PAGE 162 OF THE (EXHIBIT "A"), LINE 3 THRU 16 GIVES AN 
ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE SEQUENCE OF THE SHOOTING, (EXHIBIT "B" 
OF THE WRIT) BY THE WITNESS, Raymond Goodwin. 
ON PAGE 195 OF (EXHIBIT "A", LINE 12 THRU LINE 18) THE ASSAILANT 
DEPUTY CALLED THE DOG BACK TO HIS LOCATION, SHOT THE DOG IN THE 
HEAD AND PUT HIM DOWN. IN THE (0004) EXHIBIT, THE NECROPSY IS 
WITHOUT A MENTION OF THE SHOT [TO] EUTHANIZE THE DOG. 
IN THE ACCOUNT GIVEN AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE 187 OF 
(EXHIBIT "A"), AND THE TOP OF PAGE 188, THE ASSAILANT DEPUTY FIRED 3 
ROUNDS AT THE TIRES. ON THE PAGE (0003), THE ACCOUNT WAS "AT LEAST 
FOUR." ON THE PAGE (0002), "WHEN WE HEARD PROBABLY FOUR TO FIVE 
SHOTS AND THEN I HEARD JOHN, DEP. CHAMBERS ADVISE, THAT HE HAD 
SHOT TWO TIRES OUT." 
ON THE DIRECT APPEAL (EXHIBIT "D"), OF THE WRIT, PAGE 6, #15, THE 
SHERIFF STATED THAT THE PETITIONER/APPEALLANT HAD THE RIFLE 
POINTED AT HIM. HOWEVER, ON PAGE 130 OF (EXHIBIT "A") OF THE WRIT, 
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LINE 20 -23, THE RIFLE WAS HELD AT THE WAIST, ALSO ON PAGE 131 LINE 2 
THROUGH 16, THE TESTIMONY OF THE SHERIFF IS REFUTED BY THE DEPUTY 
JAMES WHITE, WHO OBSERVED THE INCIDENT. (IS THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
SHERIFF BEYOUND REASONABLE DOUBT?) 
AT THE TRIAL, THE STATE PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE, 5 EMPTY 
CASSINGS OF THE .225 CALIBER RIFLE, AND 14 EMPTY CASSINGS OF THE .40 
CALIBER WEAPON THAT WERE FOUND. ALSO FOUND WERE TWO EMPTY 
CLIPS THAT HOLD 11 ROUNDS EACH, ON THE PERSON OF THE ASSAILENT 
[OFFICER OF THE PEACE]. 
ISSUE (D) 
THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT A TRIAL IN FAIRNESS, 
CASE #991500129, BECAUSE THE JUDGE Kay L. Mclff, AND THE SPECIAL 
PROSECUTOR, Scott Bums, WERE RESPONDENTS IN A CIVIL CASE, CASE #2000-
CV-001 ST., FOR THE TITLE 18 U.S.C. § 4 "MISPRISION OF FELONY," FOR THE 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT, BY THE ASSAILANT OFFICE OF THE PEACE, John 
Chambers, AND THE LACK OF RESPONSE AFTER THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
(EXHIBIT "A"), FILED IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT ON THE 3R D DAY OF 
January, 2000, BY THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT. 
STATE V. Nickles 728 P. 2d 123. 131 (Utah 1986) 
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"IT IS CLEAR THAT A PROSECUTOR SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED ON A 
TIMELY MOTION WHEN HE HAS A PERSONAL CONFLICTING INTEREST IN 
THE CASE", SEE (0005) AND (0006). 
State V. Hay 859 p. 2d 1.7 (Utah 1993) 
"[T]he prosecution's responsibility is that of a minister of justice and not simply that of an 
advocate; which includes a duty to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice 
and not that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. A criminal trial is more 
than a contest between the prosecution and the defense; it is a search for truth". 
IN THE CASE, United - STATES V. MUSSER, 7P. 389, THE DISSENTING OPINION 
OF JUSTICE POWERS GAVE THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF A 
PROSECUTOR, QUOTE: 
"A PROSECUTING ATTORNEY IS NOT A PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY, BUT A 
SWORN MINISTER OF JUSTICE, AS MUCH BOUND TO PROTECT THE 
INNOCENT AS TO PURSUE THE GUILTY: WELLER V. PEOPLE 30 MICH. 16. 
"HIS POSITION IS ONE INVOLVING A DUTY OF IMPARTIALITY, NOT 
ALTOGETHER UNLIKE THE JUDGE HIMSELF. THE POSITION IS A TRYING 
ONE, BUT THE DUTY, HOWEVER, EXISTS: MEISTER V. PEOPLE. 31 MICH. 99. 
"HE REPRESENTS THE PUBLIC INTERESTS, WHICH CAN NEVER BE 
PROMOTED BY THE CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT. HIS OBJECT, LIKE 
THAT OF THE COURT, SHOULD BE SIMPLE JUSTICE, AND HE HAS NO RIGHT 
TO SACRIFICE THESE TO ANY PRIDE OF PROFESSIONAL SUCCESS, AND 
HOWEVER STRONG MAY BE HIS BELIEF IN THE PRISONER'S GUILT, HE MUST 
REMEMBER THAT THOUGH UNFAIR MEANS MAY HAPPEN TO RESULT IN 
DOING JUSTICE TO THE PRISONER IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YET JUSTICE SO 
ATTAINED IS UNJUST AND DANGEROUS TO THE WHOLE COMMUNITY; HURD 
V. PEOPLE, 25 MICH. 405". 
AT THE TRIAL, THE INTEREST OF THE Utah - STATE MUST HAVE 
OUTWEIGHED THE NEED TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE SYSTEM OF 
JUSTICE, HAVING THE PROSECUTOR CONTINUE WITH THE CASE AFTER THE 
PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS. IN THE ADDENDUM (0005), AND (0006) WAS 
15 
SUBMITTED INTO THE COURT BY THE ATTORNEY FOR THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT, Edward K. Brass. MARGULIES V. UPCHURCH. 696 P. 
2D 1195 (Utah 1985). 
"MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY OPPOSING COUNSEL PRESENT THE 
COURT WITH TWO IMPORTANT BUT OFTEN OPPOSING POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS; ON THE ONE HAND, THE UNDESIRABILITY OF 
SEPARATING LITIGANTS FROM THE COUNSEL OF THEIR CHOICE AND, 
ON THE OTHER, THE NECESSITY OF ENSURING THAT LITIGANTS AND 
THE PUBLIC PERCEIVE LAWYERS AND COURTS AS POSSESSING THE 
INTEGRITY NECESSARY FOR THE DISPOSITION OF JUSTICE. WE ARE 
ESPECIALLY MINDFUL OF THE LATTER CONSIDERATIONS, AS THIS 
COURT IS CHARGED BY LAW WITH APPROVING THE ADMINISTERING 
RULES OF CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW IN THE STATE OF Utah. U.C.A. 1953, §§ 78-51-14-19 (1977). 
AMONG THE GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WHICH WE 
HAVE APPROVED IS CANON 9 WHICH STATES: "a LAWYER SHOULD 
AVOID EVEN THE APPEARANCE OF PROFESSIONAL IMPROPRIETY". 
THE BASIS OF THIS TENET IS THAT SOCIETY'S PERCEPTION OF THE 
INTEGRITY OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM MAY BE AS IMPORTANT AS THE 
REALITY SINCE IT IS THE PERCEPTION THAT ENGENDERS PUBLIC 
CONFIDENCE THAT JUSTICE WILL BE DISPENSED..." 
"THE PRACTICE OF LAW IS A PROFESSION WHOSE MEMBERS ARE 
GRANTED A SPECIAL PRIVILEGE OF HOLDING THEMSELVES OUT AS 
HAVING THE EDUCATION, THE SKILLS AND THE INTEGRITY TO GIVE 
HELP AND GUIDANCE TO OTHERS IN THEIR AFFAIRS.... THIS 
INCLUDES THAT THE ATTORNEY WILL BECOME UNRESERVEDLY 
IDENTIFIED WITH HIS CLIENT'S INTERESTS AND PROTECT HIS 
RIGHTS. IT MEANS NOT ONLY IN DEALING WITH THE CLIENT'S 
ADVERSARY, BUT ALSO THAT THE ATTORNEY WILL ADHERE TO THE 
IDEALS OF HONESTY AND FIDELITY WITH THE CLIENT HIMSELF; 
AND THAT HE WILL NOT USE HIS POSITION TO TAKE ANY UNFAIR 
ADVANTAGE OF THE SPECIAL CONFIDENCE WHICH THE CLIENT IS 
ENTITLED TO REPOSE IN HIM." 
ID. AT 1204 (CITATION OMITTED). 
IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, THE PHRASE "CONFLICT OF INTEREST' IS 
DEFINED AS: 
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"TERM USED IN CONNECTION WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND 
FIDUCIARIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO MATTERS OF PRIVATE 
INTEREST OR GAIN TO THEM. ETHICAL PROBLEMS CONNECTED 
THEREWITH ARE COVERED BY STATUTES IN MOST JURISDICTIONS 
AND BY FEDERAL STATUTES ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL. GENERALLY 
WHEN USED TO SUGGEST DISQUALIFICATION OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL 
FROM PERFORMING HIS SWORN DUTY, TERM "CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST" REFERS TO A CLASH BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST AND 
THE PRIVATE PECUNIARY INTEREST OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
CONCERNED." GARDINER V. NASHVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF 
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF TNASHVILLE AND DAVISON 
COUNTY, TENN., c.a. Tenn., 514 f. 2d 38, 41". 
STATE V. NICKLES 728 P. 2D 123, 131 (UTAH 1986), STATE V. HAY. 859 P. 2D 1, 
7 (UTAH 1993). 
IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CARPUS IN THE LOWER 
COURT, THE JUDGE WROTE: 
"... ANY ISSUE RAISED IN THIS PETITION, NOT ALREADY ADJUDICATED, 
COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED OF DIRECT APPEAL." 
THE PETETIONER/APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT ANY CONTROL OVER 
THE CONTENTS OF THE DIRECT APPEAL, FOR THE ATTORNEY WAS 
APPOINTED BY THE COURT; AND THE SAME JUDGE THAT PRESIDED OVER 
THE TRIAL, AND DEPRIVED THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT OF THE 
CONTITUTUONAL RIGHT OF SELF DEFENCE AND A TRIAL IN FAIRNESS; 
RESIDED IN CEDAR CITY, AND THE ATTORNEY VISITED THE 
PETITIONER/APPELANT ONCE IN PRISON IN GUNNISON FOR A FEW MINUTES; 
BESIDES THE ATTORNEY HAD COPYS OF THE SAME COURT DOCUMENTS 
THAT ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT, BUT NOT 
WITHSTANDING TRAINING AND SKILL AS AN ATTORNEY FAILED TO BRING 
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UP ISSUES PARTAIINING TO THIS CASE. [WHICH BRIINGS UP AN ISSUE, THAT 
WILL NOT BE A PART OF THIS CASE, THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISSTANCE OF 
COUNSEL.] 
ON THE 9T H DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1999, IN A REMOTE WESTERN 
PORTION OF THE COUNTY OF BEAVER, 60 PLUS MILES FROM THE CLOSEST 
TOWN, THE SHERIFF AND THREE DEPUTIES, WITHOUT A WARRANT DROVE 
THAT DISTANCE FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF AN INFRACTION, OR AT THE 
MOST A MISDEMEANOR. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-6-206 (2) (A), (B), (3). 
WITH THE KNOWLEDGE FOR OVER A WEEK THAT THE TRIP WOULD BE 
MADE (EXHIBIT "A" PAGE 149, 150, AND 151). THERE WAS AMPLE TIME FOR 
OBEYING THE LAW (OBTAINING A WARRANT), (CONSTITUTION FOR THE 
United - STATES ARTICLE VI CLAUSE II, Bill of Rights AMENDMENT 4); (UTAH-
STATE CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1 § 14), AND (MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 384 U.S. 
491). 
ON THE 9T H DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1999, ON THE PRIVATE PROPERTY 
CALLED, "VANCE SPRING," WITHOUT A WARRANT, AND WITHOUT THE 
AUTHORITY (UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 77-7-15), BECAUSE, AT THE TIME 
THE ASSAILANT OFFICER OF THE PEACE WITHDREW THE WEAPON AND 
STARTED SHOOTING AT THE TRUCK, WITH THE PETITION/APPELLANT IN 
THE TRUCK, THE ASSAILANT OFFICER OF THE PEACE DID BECOME A 
CITIZEN WITH A GUN (Utah CODE ANNOTATED § 76-2-403, § 76-2-404), WITH 
THE USE OF THE DEAD[LY] FORCE. (STATE V GARDINER 814 P. 2D 568, FN3, 
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FN4.), (John Bad Elk V. U.S. 177, 529), Plummer V. STATE, 136 IND. 306), (Runyon V. 
S I A 11 , 5 / IND. SO). I OR THE ASSAILANT OFFICER OF THE PEACE DID 
COMMIT THE CRIME ()l< A FORCim I- I'M OMV \S DENNED IN I HJII COD!: 
ANNOTATED § 76-2-402. FOR THE USE OF DEAD[LY] FORCE IS ALLOW!: 
•'
 l
 Utah-CODE ANNOTATED § 7^-7-7 AND § "6-2-404. BEYOND TJII 
' • ' • • ' • - f • • •• > \ T H E ; v ". ••' 
FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE United - STATES, AMENDMENT 4 "• ' 
CONSTITUTION FOR THE Utah - STATE, ARTICLE i SECTION 1, AND ARTICLE 
1 SEl'IK >N U (.lAUANIEE llil, H O : >•>.•• \-\U .\ ; AM) i-' .X, JENABLE 
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. (MIRAND. ARIZONA ;tf • ' ^ ' ). 
VIII-CONCLUSION 
•V • < , ; • • : < • <: I F1CERS \ND THE REPORT OF 
THE NECROPSY, THE UNTRUTH^ > : \s< 
PEACE AND BY THE SHERIFF ARE REFUTED AND WITHOUT CREDITABILITY. 
<>N IMAl l)A\ IN I (Ml MINI, \ \ \ , u FROM THE ASSAILANT, IN THE REAR VIEW 
MIRROR ON THE PICKUP IIII • < ) \ \ IM 'P W \S < IMS1 R\ I I). SIM KHINii Wl III 
THE RIGHT HAND AND A DOG LUNGING AT THE LEASH HELD WITH THE 
I I'M HAND. BS llll- I'M'l I'lnNMK-APPELLANT. 
ONTHE271" I JAY < >l MAKi II, J 1)00, THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT MET 
THE PAID COUNSEL, Edward K. Brass IN THE COURT ROOM; XI THJb HOUR uF 
8.m AM M I HE HOUR OF 8:15 AM, THE PAID ATTORNEY WAS CALLED INTO 
llll ' , (1IAMBI RSDI ni l !M)(-i:, ka> I M..-II1 SI I III. Ill M IR UM» );, niL 
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PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS CALLED INTO THE CHAMBERS. IN THE 
CHAMBERS. WIII l( )l 11 CONSULTING WITH THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT, 
THE MOTION EO P \ SI>PVIAI PROSECUTOR W V. w UNDRAWN |PAGE24<H< 
.0007), AND THE JUDGE REFUSED TO RECUSE HIMSELF (PAGE ^_ 
WITII THE MEETING IN CHAMBERS OVERABOU1 !>:30 AM. V > < 
K) |A | ()l'4() I' UJPS I i| IK'ANS( '.a : Xi.-:<. Nr Ri-'CORDlNi • « ; ' " c 
EVENTS, THE FIRST 8 PAGES COVERED WITNESSES AND EXHIBI '•• Mill 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT ENTERING ON PAGE 1 <>. AND THE NEXT 24 PAGES 
I AkINo n MINN)) S VVJI \ | MAPPPlv 1RST HOUR? FOR THE 
CASE WAS DISCUSSED; AS RECORDEI • i'\GI - I INI I II IP'ol H ,11| INI ,S. 
(.0007); A COMMENT MADE BY THE JUDGE, Kay I. Mclff. WITHOUT A RECORD 
Ml- Till' DISCUSSION. AND 11 IE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CHAMBERS, AND WITH 
THEJUDGE, KayL. MdIT, AND IMP PKOSPCMOp S< "II Hums ^U IVM 
ADVERSARIES, THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT A TRIAL IN 
FAIRNESS, BY THE Utah-STATE. 
ON THE 9™ DAY < >r SEPTEMBER. EM)<>, <>N TUP PRIVA'IE PROPER I Y 
KNOWN AS VANCE SPRING, WITHOUT A WARRANT. THE ASSAILAN i 
< ' • • • • . 'i.ALL, John Chambers, WAS WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF AN 
OFFICER, AND BY ' ! IP ACTIONS AND DSP OP TUP |l UNNECESSARY DE.ADI S> | 
FORCE USED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF A MISDEMEANOR, BECAME A 
(I I I/IN Wl i l l A GUN. FOR John Chambers DID THREATON AND DID USE 
DP.ADI Y P< )RCi: AGAINST I III, 1 IIP OP I IIP PI ! j s lONER/APPEALLENT, 
BEFORE FORCE WAS USED TO STOP THE OFFICER OF THE PEACE, TURNED 
IN h i \ iTII/TN Willi A GUN.. 
ATTHETRFAI 11II PI II IK >N1I R,A1MJ1 1 I AN I \V \S DAMAGhhlH.C'AI ISK 
THE COURT DID DEPRIVE THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT OF THE INHERENT 
S NI M N AMI ENABLE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE FOR A DEFENSE, BY THE JUDGE 
Kay I NVH'I EXHIBIT "f" ML' mi . \\\i\ \. l\U,|< .!. I'AKAGKAPIlS 1 AND?., HAS 
NOTHING TO DO WITH THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 
• '
 !
":<; ?TAT. THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT WAS DAMAGED BY THE 
!
 N'.-Ki « ' i v - • E ASSAILANT OFFICER OF THE 
PEACE, John Chambers SHERIFF Kenneth Yardley AND RELIED UPON BY THE 
M IPREME COURT ON THE DIRECT APPEAL, CASE @200000465-SC, (EXHIBIT 
I ' M 'I I III' WVI I i l l A 11 \ Hamilton. /Op. i,l III 2003 ut22). 
WITH THE JUDGE, Kay L. Mclff, AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Scott Bums, 
AS CIVIL ADVERSARIES, CASE# 2000-CV-0001 TS, FILED ON THE 3RD DAY OF 
JANUARY, 2000, CHARGING THE TWO OFFICERS OF THE COURT WITH TITLE 18 
•••':•-.lM -'' Mi i A K OF RESPONSE AFTER THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING, (EXHIBIT A ) u r i n c w Ki i, FOR THE OFFICERS OF 
THE COURT DID HAVE THE KNOWLEDGE 01 11IL ATTEMPT UPON THE LIFE 
Ol- HIE MMIIiONLRAlM'LM.ANI. in 11 IL ASSAILANT OFFICER OF THE 
PEACE, John Chambers. 
A 
AFTER THE "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE, AND CERTIFICATE OF 
i K)< )I) FA! Tl I ' \Y AS Ml l.l) INI MHO A IR I, ( IM)U ,>. WITH THE "MOTION TO 
APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR. 'AND"' MilSK tRAMl »l MM M H'l'f >R ! 1NG 
MOTION TO APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR", (.0006), THE DUTY OF THE 
Jl UN il<\ Ka\ I . Mel II SI K )l II I) IIA Vli BEEN, NOTIFY THE CHIEF JUDGE FOR 
THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, AND RECUSE HIM SI-1 ,h 
FROM THE CASE; CODE OF ETHICS; Margulies V. Upchurch 696 P. 2d 119 i M Halt 
1985). 
FOR THE REASONS NT AIM) \BO\T IIIIS<<MT'I SI KM II I > Rl.VHRSE 
THE CONVICTIONS <)'•' THE PETITIONER/APPELLANT, AND REMAND II I! 
CASE BACK INT( > 1111-, TRIAL COURT FOR DISMISSAL. 
ON THE .7 DAY OF Ju^y ,2009. SI IBMI IT'l-'l) IN 1 () TTTF 
COURT OF APPEALS WITH RESPECT, BY THE PETITIONER/ APPFI LAN I. 
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton. 
Petitioner/appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
UNDER THE PENALTIES OF PERJURY THE CERTIFICATE FOLLOWING IS 
SUBSCRIBED BY THE UNDERSIGNED. 
ON THE 9TH DAY OF JULY, 2009, A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE 
APPEAL BRIEF, CASE NUMBERED: APPELLATE #20090300 CA, ORIGINAL 
#20080745-SC, D.C. #070500076, WAS MAILED, POSTAGE PREPAID, TO THE 
FOLLOWING, BY THE UNDERSIGNED. 
L. LARKfN HAMILTON 
Z e e 
Von J. Christiansen (ATTORNEY) 
2160 SOUTH 600 WEST 
P.O. BOX 471 
BEAVER, Utah - STATE [84713] 
A. (Chuck) Bigelow (WARDEN) 
255 EAST 300 NORTH 
GUNNISON, Utah - STATE [84634] 
J. Frederic Voros Jr. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 6TH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 140854 
SALT-LAKE-CTTY, Utah - STATE [84114-0854] 
C£ 
STEVE TURLEY (WARDEN) 
Utah-STATE PRISON 
P.O. BOX 250 
DRAPER, Utah-STATE [84020] 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE Utah-STATE 
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton. 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
VS. 
A. (Chuck) Bigelow; (WARDEN) 
AT THE PRISON IN GUNNISON 
OF Utah-STATE 
RESPONDENT/APPELLEE 
INCORPORATION CASE 
APPELLATE # 20090300 CA 
ORIGINAL # 20080745-SC 
D.C. # 070500076 
ADDENDUM OF PETIONER/APPELLANT 
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton. 
AN APPEAL FROM THE COURT IN DISTRICT V 
FOR THE COUNTYOF BEAVER 
THE DISMISSAL OF A WRIT OF HEBEAS CORPUS 
BY THE JUDGE G. Michael Westfall 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Von J. Christiansen (ATTORNEY) Tony-Alexander: Hamilton. 
2160 South 600 West C/O 30302, LONEPEAK A-214 
P.O. BOX 471 P.O. BOX 250 
BEAVER, Utah-STATE [84713 ] DRAPER, Utah-STATE [84020] 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT/APPELLEE PETITIONER/APPELLANT 
FOLLOW-UP BY LT. JOHN KIMBALL: 
On 09/19/99 at approximately 1600 hrs. Sheriff Phillips and I met with John Chambers at 
the Dixie Valley Medical Center in St. George. Present during this interview was Dixie Valley 
Medical Center security guard Michael Oliphant. Chambers stated when they arrived at the 
Vance Springs on 09/09/99 he went up on a hill east of the Vance Springs property to look for 
movement within the fenced area. He stated that radio communications were not yery good at 
Vance Springs and he had a difficult time communicating.jChambers'said he originally saw some 
dust as if a"vehicle was driving within the compound and then saw a blue pickup driving toward 
the old rock house at the pond. He stated he was unable to get a response from the other officers 
on the radios so he drove around the west side when Sgt. Goodwin stated there was a blue Ford 
pickup going to that area. Chambers said he was about at the south gate when this information 
was relayed by Sgt. Goodwin. He advised Sgt. Goodwin stated it looked like the blue pickup was 
going to the north gate. 
Chambers stated when he went to the north gate it was barricaded by a large trailer, that 
he exited his vehicle along with his K-9 and turned it loose. As he walked into the property he 
noticed the blue pickup parked by the pond facing east, east of the rock house. At first it 
appeared there were possibly two people either inside or on the south side of the blue pickup. 
Chambers said he thought it was Sgt. Goodwin talking with Tony Hamilton, but shortly; after that 
it was apparent it was only one person as he saw Tony get in the pickup. 
Chambers said he called Sgt. Goodwin on the radio and said the blue pickup and Tony 
were at the rock house. After Tony got in the pickup he started coming straight at him and he 
thought he was coming up to talk. When the pickup ^ got to within 15-20 ft. of him, Tony placed 
his right hand over his left hand maintaining his left hand on the steering wheel. Chambers said in 
his opinion it was a clear indication that Tony wanted him to think he had a pistol in his hand or a 
firearm. Tony stated, "that's far enough Chambers", then sped up and turned around. Chambers 
advised he told Tony several times to "hold it, Tony, stop'^ , staHn^'thafs t^'enougli -Tony, 
stop". Chambers said he shot twice, maybe three times; once at the front tire and then once, 
possibly twice at the back tire to flatten it He then told Sgt. Goodwin on die radio that he 
thought Tony was driving back to the cabin in the trees and he began jogging behind Tony's 
vehicle. Chambers said instead of driving into the trees where the residence were, Tony drove 
"back down to the pond and the rock house, facing the pickup to the west. 
Chambers stated as he was moving toward Tony and the pickup there were two or three 
shots fired in his direction by Tony, that he saw dust hit behind him and to his right. He stated 
when he looked at Tony, he saw him change his line of sight from John to his K-9 who had 
traveled farther south and was at the pond. Chambers said jt was apparent Tony was aiming at his 
dog and hi yelled atjhim "not to"do it", he stated Slon't take the shot"rHe said when the rifle 
went off he knew he had "hit the dog". Chambers said the dog immediately traveled to him with 
all his entrails hanging out and he shot his dog in the head. He said he did not shoot at Tony until 
after the dog was shot. At this time there were shots "hitting all around me" and after one or two 
steps from the dog he realized he was in a bad location, he discontinued shooting at Tony and 
attempted to sprint for the pond where there were some willows and possibly some cover. 
0001 
Chambers said he only made one or two steps before he was hit, knocking him down and he then 
called Sgt. Goodwin on the radio stating he had been hit. 
When further questioned about the ammunition Chambers had on his person when he left 
his vehicle, he stated the magazine in his pistol was full, that he had one other full magazine on his 
belt and another magazine that was only partially full and did not know for sure how many rounds 
it contained. 
End of Follow-up/Case Continues 
YOUNG: Today's date is 9/9/99, time now 1550 hrs., Dep. Young with Dep. James White 
at the Vance Springs Ranch regarding an officer involved shooting, involving a 
John Chambers and a Tony Hamilton is the suspect. 
WHITE: >0ff3/8/99 I was in Milford, Utah where I contacted Deputy Sheriff Dave Mott on" 
another detail. Dave Mott advised he was going out to Vance Springs on 9/9/99 
and for me to contact Sheriff Yardley, they might be able to use my help. I 
contacted Sheriff Yardley by phone, probably 1230 or so on 9/8/99. He advised 
Raymond Goodwin would get a hold of me and advise me what time to meet 
them. Last night about 2100, Raymond Goodwin contacted me by phone and 
advised me to meet them on SR-21 it would be about the milepost 40.5 to a dirt 
road that turns off in Pine Valley to go to Vance Springs. On 9/9/99 at about 
1020 hrs. Sheriff Yardley, Dep. Goodwin and Dep. John Chambers arrived at that 
area where I met them, we proceeded to Vance Springs. On the way into Vance 
Springs we came in contact with two of the suspects that was going to have to be 
removed for trespass, they were on their way to Milford. Sheriff Yardley and 
Dep. Goodwin went and talked with them. Dep. Chambers and myself continued 
onto to Vance Springs. As we neared the Vance Springs area, we stopped, Dep. 
Chambers got out of his vehicle and advised me he was going to walk in and for i 
me to wait for Sheriff Yardley and Goodwin and get further advise from them, bni 
he thought that one of us could just kind of surround the area to watch the gates I 
to see ifTony Hamilton was still there that we might be able to apprehend him_and\ 
takejiim in for trespass. Met Sheriff Yardley, Dep. Goodwin, we proceeded to \ 
the southeast corner of the ranch to a gate which is probably about a quarter of 
a mile north of the southeast corner and proceeded on foot. On our way in we 
heard a vehicle start up and it was headed eastbound towards us, it was a blue 
Ford pickup. It stopped in the road for a minute and then it turned around and 
left. At that point we searched the buildings there, there was nobody in the 
buildings(we then started to make a wider search when we heard probably four to 
five^shots and then I heard John, Dep. Chambers advised that he had shot two . 
tires ouLof the vehicle and it was up by the pond^ We could hear the vehicle 
revved up and coming down. Dep. Goodwin and I started headed down the road 
from the cabins which was westbound. The vehicle headed a little more south so 
we scattered down through the trees. There was other shots fired. I could hear 
Dep. Chambers yelling at Tony. Dep. Goodwin was behind me and then the next 
thing, well lost sight of Tony and then I spotted, he was walking south to the end 
of the place, climbed over the fence where I noticed Sheriff Yardley confronted 
him and they talked there for probably 40-45 minutes, maybe longer. 1 finally went 
down and started talking with Tony. Sheriff Yardley advised Tony that he thought 
that he had shot Chambers and No, Tony advised Sheriff Yardley that he had 
shot Chambers in the leg and he had also shot his dog and he advisgi that he 
would go with us if we had a warrant. We had no paperwork. He said we had 
no right being there without a warrant. We talked for a little while. Sheriff 
Yardley went to check on Dep. Chambers. Tony and I walked around to the 
south end of the fence and then turned north on the eastbound fence going up, we 
0002 
was going to unlock the gate for the ambulance to come in to take care of Dep. 
Chambers. We arrived there at the gate about 5 minutes later Sheriff Yardley 
arrived and said they wasn't there. Tony then said that to go up north, then on 
the outside of the fence, Sheriff Yardley told him to stop, that we needed to talk 
to him. Tony said he had already talked enough and continued walking. Sheriff 
Yardley continued talking with him. We both tried to talk to him and slow him 
down. We both got close and Sheriff Yardley was to the side, to the right side of 
him just a little bit so I tackled him and at that time we apprehended him, got the 
gun away and arrested him. When Sheriff Yardley confronted Tony down on the 
south end of the ranch, I was approximately a hundred yards away and it appeared 
that Tony had pointed the gun at Sheriff Yardley and it appeared that they were 
exchanging some pretty loud words at each other. When I got there Tony laid 
the rifle, the barrel of the rifle on a fence which was headed in my direction. It 
was pointed above my head. I asked Tony if he would please point the rifle in a 
different direction which he did. He also advised me that he was just protecting 
himself, that the officer had fired shots at him and he thought it was his 
constitutional right to protect himself. That was his reason for shooting the 
officer. 
YOUNG: You didn't hear any threats from Tony towards Sheriff Yardley? 
WHITE: No. 
YOUNG: Interview with Dep. White concluded at 1600 hrs., same people present, myself 
and Dep. White. 
End of Interview 
DEPUTY: J&jOf-jf &? Date: 9/18/99 Typed by: cp 
Roger Y o u n g ^ ^ Case #25156 
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footprints and 1 said let's walk in a circle here and see if we can see where these 
tracks are going. As we were walking in a circle to try to find where the tracks 
were going northwest from whercLwewere at I heardseveral gunshots which 
sounded to be a handguiClwould say at least four shots^)! told Jim something's 
gone to hell, let's get up Uiereand find out what's going on. We took off on the 
run to the west, Dep. Chambers contacted me on the radio and I believe his exact 
words were, "Raymond, he's coming right toward you and he's got two flat tires". 
A very short time after that I observed the same blue Ford pickup that I'd seen 
when we first got on the property Coming eastbound toward us, we were in the 
middle of the road, Jim White and I. The driver of that vehicle seen us when he 
got close to another road he turned and went south. As he started south I was 
about where the graveyards at and I started running down a little draw that's down 
that goes down through there, run down there I could see the pickup it was 
stopped down by the east of the farm and I was on the east side of the little ravine 
and I started to cross down. Just as I started to cross I heard a rifle report, a lot 
louder than the shots that I heard before. I called to John Chambers on the radio, 
y i he didn't answer, I called again, there was still no answer. I could then see the 
x ^ \ ^ pickup, I could see a person laying across the hood, the pickup was basically in a -
^ &] westerly direction. This person, as I got closer, I am familiar with Tony Hamilton 
"vi v and was able to identified Tony, I was probably somewhere between 150-175 yds. 
jv ~ ^ After the rifle shot I heard several what sounded like handgun shots, I heard 
^ \^  another rifle shot, I could hear John running, or I couldn't hear him runnin^but 
^ j ^ I could hear him hollering^fyoul^^iierfocker you tofleci my^ogTyou re a dead ^ 
^ vL m a n T o n ^ I heard anotherriTle shot, more what sounded like handgun shot and^ 
^ N^ 4~a3Twas crossing the ravine I heard a bullet buzz that went to my left right after 
\ ^ that I heard a rifle shot, right after that I heard another bullet buzz to my right and 
^ \ another rifle shot. Looking at the truck I could see Tony standing by the 
somewhere on the drivers side of the truck, away from the truck, a partly dead 
cedar tree which I run over and got behind it, called John on the radio, John told 
Qi ^ me he had been hit. I asked him how bad and he said it was bad, called him a 
couple more times, there was no answer. I could no longer see Tony by the truck, 
I ran to the south where the little draw I. was in started to open up, I wanted to 
get around to where John was at, I could see there was no way that I could get 
from where I was at to where it appeared to be John laying out in the middle of 
a field in an open area without running into Tony. As I evaluated the situation 
John being hit, I decided the best thing for me to do was get back to my truck 
which was on the west side of the property. I run through the trees past the house 
over to the gate, climbed the gate, got in my truck, went back out to the main 
road, started in a southwesterly direction around to the southwest corner of where 
there used to be a gate there. That gate was also barricaded with the same type 
of pipe and cement. I pulled off the road to the left, went to where I could cut 
the fence and get through the fence, jumped out, cut the fence, got back into my 
vehicle and drove onto the property over to where there's a rock house and a pond 
and as I approached the area 1 could see Tony's truck or the truck that Tony was 
in, could not see Tony anywhere around there. Went to where John was at, put 
v V 
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-?*EBgSst 10,1999 
^aian Creek Veterinary Is,, aces 
P.O. Box 2320 • 1501 N. Hwy 357 • Beaver, Utah 84713 
(435) 438-2873 • FAX (435) 438-5785 
RUDY L. JORDAN D.V.M. 
James W. Masner, Detective 
Millard County Sheriffs Office 
765 South Hwy 99 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
Dear Detective Masner: 
Please find enclosed the necropsy report on Max. Also find enclosed an invoice for 
rendered. Thank you for asking us to help. Good luck building your case. 
R. L; Jordan, DVM 
xTh*> Fnri nftU* Tmil fs%r f)nn1it\i V*t*>™rm C^- , . ;^ 
P.O. Box 2320 • 1501 N. Hwy 357 • Beaver, Utah 84713 
(435) 438-2873 • FAX (435) 438-5785 
RUDY L. JORDAN D.V.M. 
A necropsy is requested by the Millard County Sheriff's Office on "Max* a law 
enforcement dog who was allegedly shot on August 9, 1999. 
Max is a 7yr old Belgium Malamos tan and black in color. He is current on all 
vaccinations evidenced by records held by our clinic. 
Findings: A large portion of the small intestine is eviscerated through a wound 
(approximately 4 cm in length and 1.5 cm in width) in the right lower flank. 
Copious amounts of blood both clotted and unclotted are present in the 
abdominal cavity. The clotted blood is centered in an area at the pelvic inlet. 
The caudal aorta at the iliac bifurcation has been destroyed. Both internal and 
external iliac arteries are also destroyed. A small wound 2-3mm in diameter is 
present in the left lateral perineal area. 
Conclusions: This animal was shot from the rear at some angle such that the 
bullet entered the perineal area travelling through the pelvic canal until such 
time as the bullet hit the caudal aorta and associated branches and then exited 
the abdomen in the right lower flank. Cause of death was exsanguination due to 
the severing of a major blood vessel. 
Questions about this matter can be directed to my office at the above listed 
phone and address. 
R. LKJordan, DVP 
Utah License 11'8009 
The End of the Trail for Quality Veterinary Service" 
{*) K^ .0 
EDWARD K. BRASS (432) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)322-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 322-5677 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton! 
a.k.a. TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
a.k.a. RICHARD ADAM, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE 
AND CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
Case No. 991500129 
; Judge Ka\ L. Mclff 
The Defendant Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, by counsel, Edward K. Brass, hereby moves to 
disqualify the Court from this case. 
This motion is supported by an affidavit of prejudice detailing the basisjfor the motion. 
DATED this 7A day of March 2000. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant 
0005 
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
I hereby certify that this motion to disqualify and accompanying affidavit are filed 
in good faith. 
DATED this M day of Marc 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Disqualify 
and Certificate of Good Faith was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Scott M. Burns, Special Deputy 
Beaver County Attorney, P.O. Box 428. Cedar City, Utah 84720, this £>F day of March 
2000. 
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EDWARD K. BRASS (432) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)322-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 322-5677 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, 
a.k.a. TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
a.k.a. RICHARD ADAM, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE 
Case No. 991500129 
Judge Kay L. Mclff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Edward K. Brass, being duly sworn upon his oath as the affiant herein files this his 
Affidavit of Prejudice against the Honorable Kay L. Mclff, Judge in the above entitled case, 
and alleges as follows: 
L I am counsel for the Defendant, Tony-Alexander; Hamilton. 
2. I have learned that the defendant has sued Judge Mclff civilly in the following 
case: Tonv Alexander Hamilton v. Paul G. Barton. Bruce Brown, John Chambers. Kenneth 
Yardlev. Raymond Goodwin. James White. Leo G, KanelL Ed Phillips. John Kimball. 
Dexter Anderson. Scott Burns and KJL. Mclffl 2000 CV 0001. This case was filed in the 
United States District Court on January 3. 2000. 
3. Based upon my research, I believe that the juxtaposition of the defendant and 
trial judge as civil adversaries creates at least an appearance of bias requiring 
disqualification of Judge Mclff from this case. 
DATED this 3 | day of March 2000. 
EDWARD K. BRASS ^ U 
Attorney for Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
) 
:ss 
) 
Personally appeared before me in Salt Lake County. State of Utah. Edward K. Brass, 
who having read the foregoing Affidavit swears that the contents thereof are true according to the 
best of his information and belief and he has executed the same. 
% *i mm m m i , i m m<m 
MARGIE COLES-MILLARD L 
No*cyy PuDiic I 
State cf Utah f 
MyComn Exc*rr* Aor5 2X2 f 
MS ro^iMiStarExpife^!^^ 
\(.}g^j 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
JT-P 
••tf./i '• v» / 
2 
M4aj££i2BTIFICATE 
• hereby c e r t f y t h a t a t r a e a n d 
w a s m a „ e , p o s t a g e p r e . p a i d ™ e f o r e g o , ™ a v 
'
U1JS
 ' I day of Marc* ~ ^ 
't of Prejudice 
P.O.Box 
EDWARD K. BRASS (432) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)322-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 322-5677 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 1 
v. 
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, 
a.k.a. TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
a.k.a. RICHARD ADAM, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO APPOINT 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
Case No. 991500129 
Judge Kay L. Mclff 
The Defendant, Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, by counsel, Edward K. Brass, hereby moves the 
Court to appoint a special prosecutor in this case. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum of points a#d ^horities. 
DATED this^f day of March 2000. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Appoint 
Special Prosecutor was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Scott M. Burns, Special Deputy Beaver County 
Attorney, P.O. Box 428, Cedar City, Utah 84720, t W T V ^ / day of March^OOO. //*} 
EDWARD K. BRASS (432) 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South 600 East 
Sail Lake City. Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801)322-5678 
Facsimile: (801) 322-5677 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Tony-Alexander: Hamilton, 
a.k.a. TONY ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
a.k.a. RICHARD ADAM, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
MOTION TO APPOINT 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
Case No. 991500129 
Judge Kay L. Mclff 
FACTS 
Mr. Hamilton is facing numerous serious criminal allegations in the above-entitled case, 
which is currently being prosecuted by Special Deputy Beaver County Attorney Scott M. Burns. 
Mr. Hamilton has sued the prosecutor in numerous civil matters, including: 
Many of these cases involve property disputes between Hamilton and the local government, the 
underlying background facts of this case. 
As is detailed below in the argument, the juxtaposition of Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Burns as 
civil adversaries creates a conflict of interest which calls for the appointment of a special prosecutor. 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-10a-12 provides the mechanism b\ which the Court is empowered 
to alleviate prosecutorial conflicts of interest by appointing special prosecutors. That provision 
states. 
(1) The state may be represented before any grand jury summoned in the state by 
the attorney general and his assistants, count) attorney or district attorney and his 
deputies, and special prosecutors appointed under this chapter and their assistants. 
(2) The supervising judge shall determine if a special prosecutor is necessary. He 
may appoint a special prosecutor only upon good cause shown and after making a 
written finding that a conflict of interest exists in the office of the attorney general 
or the office of the county attorney or district attorney who would otherwise represent 
the state before the grand jury. 
(3) In selecting a special prosecutor, the supervising judge shall give preference to 
the attorney general and his assistants, and the count) attorney or district attorney and 
his deputies. 
(4) (a) The compensation of a special prosecutor appointed under this chapter who 
is an employee of the Office of the Attorney General or the office of a county 
attorney or district attorney is only the current compensation he receives in that 
office. 
(b) The compensation for an appointed special prosecutor who is not an employee 
of a prosecutorial office under Subsection (4)(a) shall be comparable to the 
compensation of a deputy or assistant attorney general having similar experience to 
that of the special prosecutor. 
"It is clear that a prosecutor should be disqualified on a timely motion when he has a personal 
conflicting interest in a case." State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123. 131 (Utah 1986). It is critical that 
prosecutors be conflict free, because of their unique ethical obligations. As the court explained in 
State v. Hav. 859 P.2d K 7 (Utah 1993). 
[T]he prosecution's responsibility is that of "a minister of justice and not simply that 
of an advocate," which includes a duty "to see that the defendant is accorded 
procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence." A 
criminal trial is more than a contest between the prosecution and the defense; it is a 
search for the truth. 
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Another good description of the unique role of prosecutor comes from the dissenting opinion of 
Justice Powers in United States v. Musser. 7 P. 389, where he stated, 
A prosecuting attorney is not a plaintiffs attorney, but a sworn minister of justice, as 
much bound to protect the innocent as to pursue the guiltv: Wellar v. People* 30 
Mich. 16. 
His position is one involving a duty of impartiality, not altogether unlike that of the 
judge himself. The position is a trying one, but the duty, however, exists: Meister v. 
People. 31 Mich. 99. 
He represents the public interests, which can never be promoted by the conviction 
of the innocent. His object, like that of the court, should be simple justice, and he has 
no right to sacrifice these to any pride of professional success, and however strong 
may be his belief in the prisoner's guilt, he must remember that though unfair means 
may happen to result in doing justice to the prisoner in the particular case, yet justice 
so attained, is unjust and dangerous to the whole community; Hurd v. People. 25 
Mich. 405. 
Id. at 401-02. 
An actual conflict of interest is demonstrated when a person is faced with choices which 
would advance his interests, to the detriment of his client's. See ej*. State v. LovelL 1999 UT 40. 
at t22: 984 P.2d 382. 387. cert, denied. 145 L.Ed.2d 679 (2000). 
Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase "conflict of interest" as follows: 
Term used in connection with public officials and fiduciaries and their relationship 
to matters of private interest or gain to them. Ethical problems connected therewith 
are covered by statutes in most jurisdictions and by federal statutes on the federal 
level. Generally, when used to suggest disqualification of a public official from 
performing his sworn duty, term "conflict of interest" refers to a clash between public 
interest and the private pecuniary interest of int individual concerned. Gardener v. 
Nashville Housing Authority of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davison 
County. Tenn.. C.A. Teniu 514 F.2d 38,4L 
Under these definitions of actual conflict of interest, the prosecutor has a conflict of interest 
in this case, because he has a demonstrated adversarial relationship against Mr. Hamilton, involving 
3 
the prosecutor's personal interests, and is simultaneous!) charged with maintaining the equanimit) 
required of a minister of justice in the case between the government and Mr. Hamilton. In his 
position as prosecutor in this case. Mr. Bums will be left to choose between taking actions which 
further his personal interests, or actions which further the lofty interests of his prosecutorial office. 
See e.g. Lovell: Blacks, supra. 
It appears that in this context, the Court must balance whatever interest the State of Utah has 
in having Mr. Bums continue with this case, against the need to protect the integrity of the justice 
system, and the appearance of fairness of the justice system. As the court explained in Margulies 
v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985), 
Motions to disqualify opposing counsel present the court with two important but 
often opposing policy considerations: on the one hand, the undesirability of 
separating litigants from the counsel of their choice and. on the other, the necessity 
of ensuring that litigants and the public perceive lawyers and courts as possessing the 
integrity necessary for the disposition of justice. We are especially mindful of the 
latter consideration, as this Court is charged by law with approving and administering 
rules of conduct and discipline governing the practice of law in the State of Utah. 
U.C.A.. 1953, §§ 78-51-14, -19 (1977). Among the guidelines for professional 
conduct which we have approved is Canon 9, which states: "A lawyer should avoid 
even the appearance of professional impropriety." The basis of this tenet is that 
society's perception of the integrity of our legal system may be as important as the 
reality, since it is the perception that engenders public confidence that justice will be 
dispensed. . . 
"The practice of law is a profession whose members are granted a special privilege 
of holding themselves out as having the education, the skills and the integrity to give 
help and guidance to others in their affairs This includes that the attorney will 
become unreservedly identified with his client's interests and protect his rights. It 
means not only in dealing with the client's adversary, but also that the attorney will 
adhere to the ideals of honesty and fidelity with the client himself: and that he will 
not use his position to take any unfair advantage of the special confidence which the 
client is entitled to repose in him." 
Id. at 1204 (citation omitted). 
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While Mr. Burns is obviously an attorney of the highest caliber, whom the 
State of Utah is fortunate to have as a public servant the civil litigation betweent 
him and Mr. Hamilton creates an appearance of impropriety that is inimical to the 
appearance of the justice system. Given their relationship as civil adversaries, Mr. 
Bums should not wield the power of the prosecutor against Mr. Hamilton. Thus 
replacing Mr. Bums with a conflict free special attorney is in order. See id. 
Dated this day of March 2000. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Supporting Motion to Appoint Special Prosecutor was mailed, postage pre-paid, to 
Scott M. Bums, Special Deputy Beaver County Attorney, P.O. Box 428, Cedar 
City, Utah 84720. this day of March 2000. 
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1 (The following proceedings were 
2 held in chambers:) 
3 THE COURT: Just let me show you, I have two jury 
4 lists. That's alphabetical. 
5 MR, BRASS: This is a sorted one. 
6 THE COURT: And this is a sorted one. This is 
7 computer sorted. Here's what my inclination is. Usually, 
8 I use a strike and replace, but where we are looking at 
9 this many jurors, I'm inclined to fill the box with 14 or 
10 so, and then fill the front row so we've got about 30 
11 people to start with. And that we'll focus in on that 
12 first 30 and deal with them in detail. If we need to 
13 retire to chambers for any private questions or responses, 
14 we can get to that. But I'd like to get about 3 0 people 
15 that we think are qualified that we can deal with in terms 
16 of peremptories and paneling. I am proposing that we seat 
17 two alternates and that each of you have five peremptory 
18 I challenges. 
19 MR. BRASS: That's okay. 
2 0 THE COURT: Is that okay? 
21 MR. BRASS: Sure. 
22 THE COURT: So we would need 20 people after 
23 ! challenges for cause. 
24 MR. BURNS: Yeah. 
2 5 THE COURT: So we'll try to qualify out there, 
without making any motions to disqualify for cause, try to 
get about 2 0 people. 
MR. BURNS: The alternate is who? 
MR. BRASS: Last two. 
THE COURT: Last two. 
MR. BRASS: What about --
THE COURT: And then we come in chambers on the 
record and talk about challenges for cause and see if the 
3 0 we've got give us enough room for challenges for cause. 
If they don't, we'll go out and seat the second row and 
then come back and look at the challenges for cause again. 
MR. BRASS: What about the strike and replace. 
You start talking about that. I have tried a couple of 
cases with you in the past. And that's confusing for me, I 
have to tell you. I mean, because you've got, all of a 
sudden, number seven's open, and you are plugged in to a 
different person, and you are taking notes in the same box. 
Maybe I got to come up with a different style. 
THE COURT: I am proposing not to use that today. 
Frankly, it's the only procedure that has been authorized 
by the rules. 
MR. BRASS: Rule? 
THE COURT: Since statehood. 
MR. BRASS: Really? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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MR. BURNS: That's the only procedure I have ever 
done. 
MR. BRASS: I have never done it that way except 
with you. 
THE COURT: The third district started doing this 
struck method where you start doing it like I am talking 
about. 
MR. BURNS: Then they are gone. 
MR. BRASS: Say you take number seven off. He 
said 30, you would start talking to 31. And --
MR. BURNS: Seven's gone. 
MR. BRASS: And you count down eight from the top, 
however many there are. 
THE COURT: Right. When you actually -- if we 
qualify -- let's say we qualified 30. Thirty's on our list 
when it comes to you for peremptories. Well, that will 
work, it's either 35, thirty-five on that list. It's --
you start from the top down. 
MR, BURNS: So we take the first 20. 
THE COURT: You take the first -- well, we take 
the first 10 that are not stricken. 
MR. BRASS: Right. But we are picking from the 
first 20. 
THE COURT: Picking from'the first 20. But if you 
strike number 34, it just means you are --
1 MR. BRASS: It's dumb. 
2 THE COURT: -- your strike doesn't mean anything, 
3 that we are taking from the top down. 
4 MR. BURNS: Doesn't mean anything. That's what I 
5 would probably do. 
6 MR. BRASS: Okay. I got it. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 THE CLERK: I'm not sure I have it clear. 
9 THE COURT: We are going to fill the box from the 
10 front row. I think that will give us about 30. You can 
11 give us a couple extra chairs in front. Give us four 
12 chairs in front there, and then we won't crowd the front 
13 row. We may get 30, we may get 32 when we have that front 
14 row filled up. 
15 THE CLERK: You want 16 for the panel then, or do 
16 you want 18? I mean, for the panel, 18 chairs over there 
17 and --
18 THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, give me 18 chairs, then we 
19 fill the front row. 
20 THE COURT: Then we fill the front row. That's 
21 going to give us 30, 32 apiece. 
22 THE CLERK: Okay. And when I get to it, the 
23 I peremptory list, do you want me to list them, the ones that 
24 are left, because that's when I fill" in that peremptory 
25 list, the ones that we are selecting from. 
THE COURT: Say you have a list of 32, that's the 
box, and the front row. 
THE CLERK: Right. 
THE COURT: We have 32. We are going to not 
eliminate any of them out there unless there is somebody 
that just needs to be eliminated clearly, because his 
brother is married to the sheriff's wife's sister. So we 
say I'm going to have to let you go. I'll let him go right 
on the spot. If I do that, then don't include that person 
on your list. But we'll come up back here with a list of 
30, 32 people before we have exercised any challenges for 
cause, unless I have preemptively done it out on the bench. 
We'll come back here and we'll talk then about challenges 
for cause. We may strike off eight for cause. And then 
they are just removed from your list. And your list 
shortens up. But you can just put, right to the list, 
strike him out for cause and hand them the list that 
remains. That's the list they are going to exercise their 
peremptories from. And they will exercise their 
peremptories. And the first 10 going down that still 
remain, those will be the jury. 
Does that make sense? 
MR. BRASS: Sure. Yes. Can we get one of these? 
The sorted list. 
THE COURT: Yep. She's going to give you --
13 
1 she'll give you both lists. 
2 THE CLERK: You want this one here? 
3 THE COURT: Yeah. But I want to talk with you 
4 first about something else. See those four with the red 
5 box checks, and that one? 
6 THE CLERK: Let me make a correction. This one, 
7 Orlene Chestnut and Virginia Dastrup are the only two that 
8 have not reported in. 
9 THE COURT: But these were summonsed on the 
10 I other --
11 THE CLERK: But they don't know it. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. We have two juries scheduled 
13 this morning. One case settled. And they called all the 
14 jurors not to come in, except these five were not called. 
15 They couldn't receive them. So those are going to -- well, 
16 she said three of them have already reported in. They 
17 assume they are on this panel. I question to you, what do 
18 ' you want me to do with'them? Do you want me to strike 
19 them? Do you want me to put them at the bottom, see if we 
2 0 need to get to them, or do you want me to leave them in the 
21 order they now appear? 
22 MR. BRASS: Well, they are past what you perceive 
23 to be the cutoff anyway, so is it really a problem? 
24 THE COURT: Well, it would only be a problem when 
2 5 we come back here and we don't have enough jurors. If we 
have to strike for cause, you know, too many, then we'll go 
back out and qualify a bunch more, then we'll come back 
again. So I can either leave them where they are or I can 
put them at the bottom of the list. 
MR. BRASS: Why don't we just leave them where 
they are, since the list is already done, especially. 
THE COURT: Is that okay with you? 
MR. BURNS: That's all right with me. 
THE COURT: Okay. She'll give you a photocopy of 
this and you can see the checks. They were summonsed, they 
don't know what case' they were summonsed for, but it 
doesn't matter to us. All right. Why don't we get 
Mr. Hamilton here. I want to put on the record our venue 
stipulation if we haven't done that. 
MR. BRASS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And then I'll discuss with you these 
motions. And I'll tell you where I think I am, and you can 
respond if you need to. Anything else that either of you 
is aware of? 
MR. BRASS: You think you are going to go past tax 
stuff today? 
MR. BURNS: No. I don't anticipate. I guess it 
just depends on how fast it goes. 
MR. BRASS: Okay. 
MR. BURNS: Do you care if I give him this? 
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MR. BRASS: No. 
MR. BURNS: That's a proposed witness list. And 
that's a proposed exhibit list that sets forth the exhibit 
as marked and the witnesses that may be necessary to 
introduce those exhibits. Kind of play it by ear. 
THE CLERK: We have Mr. Hamilton here. 
please. 
chair. 
THE COURT: Come in, Mr. Hamilton, if you will, 
Let's get another chair for him. We'll get a 
We'll get a seat for you, Mr. Hamilton. 
MR. BRASS: So they came through with the clothes? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: The_record may reflect that_we are in 
chambers. I/ve had a discussion in the past few moments 
with counsel. I have had a reporter here. And he's been 
taking down what we have talked about as we waited for you 
to come. 
Very briefly, here's what we have talked about. 
We are going to be selecting the jury this morning. And I 
have two jury lists. One list is alphabetical. And your 
counsel has a copy of this. And it shows an alphabetical 
list of all the perspective jurors by name and the 
community in which they live within this county. I have a 
second list that has been produced by the computer 
1 randomizing the order of all of these persons so that we'll 
2 call the role alphabetically to see who we have here. But 
3 then when it comes to seating the perspective jurors, as 
4 selecting them, we won't follow alphabetical order, we --
5 the computer program that randomizes that and just gives it 
6 to us all mixed up. And my clerk has that list right now 
7 copied. You see it starts with R. W. A. B. F. S. Anyway, 
8 we'll seat them this -- in this manner. Seat them in the 
9 box and on the front row. We'll seat about 30 people or 
10 so. 
11 From that group, we will ultimately select eight 
12 persons plus two alternates to hear the case. I select two 
13 alternates in case something were to happen in the course 
14 of a week that prevented one from serving. I would propose 
15 not to identify who the alternates are until they retire to 
16 deliberate. Then the two will be excused. The last two 
17 selected would be the alternates. So it would be -- we'll 
18 end up with 10, and the two bottom ones will be the 
19 alternates. I won't tell them now because I want them to 
20 pay close attention. I will tell them there will be two 
21 alternates. But that's all I'll tell them. When they 
22 retire to deliberate, I'll excuse the alternates. Is that 
23 agreeable? 
24 MR. BRASS: Sure. 
25 \ THE COURT: Agreeable? 
1 MR. BURNS: Agreeable, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Are you agreeable with -- both sides 
3 agreeable with the randomization which has occurred through 
4 the computer? 
5 MR. BURNS: Yes, sir. 
6 MR. BRASS: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: Thank you. We'll seat, as I said, in 
8 the box 18, then about however how many the front row will 
9 accept, maybe another 12 to 15. So, hopefully, we'll have 
10 around 30, 32 persons off the top of this list. That will 
11 take us first page and maybe over on the second page. Then 
12 I'll individually qualify those. I'll ask them some 
13 general questions about who they are and any ties to this 
14 case or any information. I'll ask them those questions. 
15 Then I'll allow counsel, allow you to supplement questions 
16 that you wish to ask. 
17 MR. BRASS: Directly or through you? 
18 THE COURT: Well, I want you to run them by me. 
19 MR. BRASS: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: I want to be generous, but I would 
21 appreciate it if you would run them through me. Then we'll 
22 ask them. I want a fair jury. And I know all of us want 
23 that. Anyway, when we complete that process, with those 30 
24 or 32, I will not require any challenges for cause to be 
25 made on the record out in the presence of the potential 
jurors. We will come into chambers here, and I'll ask 
counsel for challenges for cause. These are people who 
shouldn't serve because of some tie to this case or some 
special factor that disqualifies them. Then we'll have a 
list that remains. There must be at least 20 persons on 
that list after those have been stricken for cause. And on 
that 20, now I propose that each side be allowed to strike 
five for whatever reason they want -- well, subject to the 
constitutional limitations. You can't strike based on race 
or sex. But, anyway, you strike them, prosecution one, 
defense one, prosecution two, defense two, until 10 people 
are stricken. That will leave 10 remaining. Those 10 will 
hear the case. The first eight plus the two next will be 
the alternates. Any question about that, Mr. Hamilton? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. If we have more challenges 
for cause than we have jurors qualified, when we have that 
first in chambers review, we'll go back out and we'll fill 
up that second row out there in the same order. We'll just 
start with where we left off on this list, 31 or two or 
whatever, and we'll just go down and pick up the next 
bunch, and we'll qualify them. Then we'll come back in 
here and exercise our challenges for cause. That's 
agreeable? 
MR. BRASS: Yes. 
19 
1 MR. BURNS: Yes. 
2 THE COURT: All right. See any question about our 
3 jury selection process? 
4 MR. BURNS: No. 
5 MR. BRASS: No. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. Now, there are a couple other 
7 t)hings I thought we ought to do here this morning. One has 
8 to do with the matter of venue. This is a Beaver County 
9 case. Everything about it is Beaver County except we are 
10 hearing it here in Richfield. I moved it here on the basis 
11 of a telephone conference with both lawyers indicating they 
12 felt like it would be difficult to obtain a fair trial in 
13 Beaver County. We talked about the possibility of moving 
14 it to Iron County next door to the south. This county 
15 neighbors on the east. And I think both sides preferred to 
16 do it here in Sevier County and so stipulated. Is that 
17 correct, Mr. Burns? 
18 MR. BURNS: That's correct, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Mr. Brass? 
2 0 MR. BRASS: That's correct. 
21 THE COURT: And you agree, Mr. Hamilton? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
23 MR. BURNS: And, for the record, the main reason I 
24 stipulated to come here and not my home county is, you 
2 5 know, deference to counsel to drive, and the deference to 
the defendant that there not be any appearance that I tried 
to move it to Iron County. I think this is a neutral 
county. 
MR. BRASS: You never suggested that it be moved 
to Iron County, actually. 
MR. BURNS: Right. 
THE COURT: I raised that possibility with both 
lawyers. All right. Now, I have several motions, pretrial 
motions that have been filed. If you are in agreement, 
I'll give you my take as to where I am on those motions. 
If there is something else I should consider, then --
MR. BRASS: They are my motions, so I am in 
agreement with that proceeding. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, there is a motion in 
limine with respect to gun ownership. 
MR. BRASS: It's styled that way. But let me help 
you with that before we go too far into it. Scott and I 
met to go over with the evidence, would be in the'exhibits 
in an effort to make this a little bit faster. And there 
were a number of, I'm going to say eight, I could be wrong, 
two in either direction, probably, rifles and shotguns that 
were seized in a trailer that was purportedly occupied by 
Mr. Hamilton after this event occurred. The trailer, 
frankly, in my view, has nothing to do with this case at 
all. It never was near the trailer, by the trailer. None 
21 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I of these actions take place anywhere. 
THE COURT: Trailer is on the property. 
MR. BRASS: It's on the property, but the property 
is 64 0 acres. And Irm not real clear in my own mind how 
close to the trailer any of this stuff happens, but it's 
not anywhere near --
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BRASS: -- those guns, in my view. Really 
don't have anything to do with this case. One aspect that 
a juror might conclude is this is some heavily armed 
recluse that's prepared to shoot it out with the police 
just by virtue of his armaments. I'm concerned by the 
number of firearms will be used in some way by the jury in 
a prejudicial fashion against Mr. Hamilton. They weren't 
used. They don't have any connection to this case. I 
don't believe that Sergeant Chambers knew that they were in 
there. There is no discussion about them in any reports 
anywhere other than they are taken out of the trailer and 
f that's it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BRASS: So it's more than ownership. And I am 
sorry I styled it that way, but it's more than just 
ownership. 
THE COURT: All right. I think I understand your 
motion. I read your response. Anything else? 
22 
MR. BURNS: Just to supplement it, I think it's 
key to this case why Deputy Chambers shot out the tires of 
this defendant. He testified as recently as a couple of 
weeks ago in Fillmore, before Judge Eyre, that he did not 
want the defendant to get to that rock house or -- where he 
had seen a large number of long rifles, or he did not want 
the defendant to get access to that type of armament. 'And 
that's why he shot out the tires. And I think it's not 
only relevant, I think it's crucial to the state's case to 
show that. I'm not going to call him a gun crazy recluse. 
But I guess he had all those guns and he had all that 
ammunition. And I think it is very, very relevant. He was 
also mobile in a truck. And the fact that he didn't get 
there doesn't mean that he wouldn't or couldn't. He drove 
the truck, then he was later on foot. So I think it's very 
relevant to show he had access to that kind of fire power. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm willing to treat 
it as it surfaces, but my general'-- my general response is 
this: The mere fact of gun ownership I do not consider 
relevant. Nor is it appropriate to introduce the fact of 
gun ownership to show bad character. To the extent that 
the officer has knowledge and to the extent that the facts 
lend themselves to the reasonable conclusion that the 
defendant could access, either immediately- or by avoiding 
arrest, could access a place where he could dig in and give 
23 
rise to serious threats to the officers or others, then it 
could be relevant. But it would require a solid 
foundation. 
I'm of the view that the crucial issues in this 
case, based on what I've heard today, center around the 
reasonableness of the officers' conduct and the 
reasonableness of the defendant's response in defense of 
his person. We are just going to have to let that unfold. 
And the mere fact of reasonableness suggests that what 
these people were aware of and what they were perceiving is 
germane. 
MR. BRASS: So that motion --
THE COURT: I'll just --
MR. BRASS: It's under advisement. 
THE COURT: It's under advisement. I'm giving you 
a general feeling of where I am. I can see it being 
relevant if there is sufficient foundation. 
MR. BRASS: Okay. Fair enough. 
THE COURT: AjJL-XJjgh-t • With respect to^ 
prosecutor --
MR. BRASS: I ' mj^oi ng to -- just a minute. 
(Whereupon, an off the record discussion took place.) 
MR. BRASS: We'll withdraw that one. 
THE COURT: You are going to withdraw that motion? 
_ ~ • — • . — • ' \ 
MR. BRASS: Yes. And the reason we are 
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withdrawing it is we are all here prepared to go to motion. 
The motion asking you to recuse yourself has been denied, 
We are ready to go. Everyone's here. We are going to 
withdraw that motion. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. The motion to 
dismiss with respect to the service dog, the evidence that 
I heard at this preliminary hearing was the dog was shot. 
It left Officer Chambers. I gathered from the testimony of 
Officer Chambers, then the testimony of the other --or the 
other law enforcement people recounting some conversation 
with the defendant, and there is likely going to be a 
dispute as to whether the dog was shot en route to getting 
a drink in the pond or en route to attack the defendant. 
But, in any event, that preceded the exchanging of deadly 
fire between the defendant and Deputy Chambers. And so I'm 
not persuaded that there is solid basis to suggest that the 
dog wasn't a service dog at the time. 
MR, BRASS: Let me make that one easier for both. 
The one -- and the one that relates to Deputy Chambers, I 
would ask you to do the same as you have done with respect 
to count one. And to hold those, the purpose of those is 
in part, of course, is to point out what I think will be 
issues during the course of the trial, and wait and see 
what the evidence is going to be at the conclusion of the 
state's case. 
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THE COURT: I intend to do that. And my final 
point on that motion is, I think there are several jury-
questions that center about what the officer did, what the 
defendant did, when they did it, and who fired first, who 
invoked deadly force first. I think those are issues. We 
are just going to have to see what the evidence shows. 
The motion with respect to trespassing, the motion 
in limine with respect to trespassing. 
MR. BRASS: That's a tough -- let me just be heard 
briefly on that. What happens with respect to this, as I 
understand it, there is an effort to have a valid sale in 
1991 through a fellow who will testify today, I imagine. 
The problem is that it's advertised and sold pursuant to a 
statute that doesn't exist. 
THE COURT: First time. 
MR. BURNS: First time. 
MR. BRASS: First time. Fifty-nine time 64. 
MR. BURNS: Second time they get the right 
THE COURT: Up until the deed. 
MR. BURNS: Until the deed. 
MR. BRASS: That's irrelevant. I don't think it 
statute. 
is. I think they have to strictly comply with the statute 
in order for it to be a valid sale. ' In fact, that they 
used a wrong statutory on the deed itself, which is the 
document that transfers title, means the sale is void in 
spite of all that's taken place since that time. It's kind 
of like the concept of jurisdiction, either you have it or 
you don't. And they don't have it by filing a deed that 
doesn't comply with the statute. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to leave the -- I'll 
I 
leave it open. I won't totally foreclose it. Very 
minimum, they are jury issues. But my initial inclination 
is, having gone through the proper procedure the second 
time around up until filing the deed, I'm not sure that the 
deed even needed to recite the code. That may have been 
surplusage in the deed, having no effect at all. In any 
event, there was a follow-up action resulting in a judgment 
not appealed which concluded that the defendant had no^ 
right, title, or interest in the property. There was a 
subsequent prosecution for trespass and conviction. I find 
it difficult, in the wake of all of that, to argue 
detrimental reliance and estoppel, but I'll leave it open. 
But I wanted you to know my general impressions about that 
motion. 
MR. BRASS: Sure. 
THE COURT: The motion in limine regarding 
religious beliefs, I agree with the defense. And I presume 
the prosecution, that the defendant "ought not be convicted 
for religious beliefs or ought not be any reliance on the 
27 
religious beliefs to sustain a conviction. The only 
possible relevance is if somehow there is enough history of 
this defendant and his relationship with the law and the 
officers to form a basis in the officer's mind for 
reasonable belief that he was in serious danger of bodily 
harm. There may be some relevance, but it would be pretty 
minimal. I'm assuming that that won't be an issue. Is it 
in your mind? 
MR. BURNS: I don't think his religious beliefs 
are going to be an issue, Your Honor, to tell you the 
truth. I don't know what his religious beliefs are. I 
have no idea. And I say that with all sincerity. I have 
had people ask me, well, what religion is Mr. Hamilton? 
What is this all about? I tell them I don't know. But 
what I do think is crucial to this case is for the state to 
be allowed to show what his attitude is with respect to 
government and with respect to law enforcement. And that 
starts out in 1985 with the filing of the declaration by 
the fraternity, then later a filing by the foundation, the 
Emmanuel Foundation. Then a deed relating to the property 
is deeded to that group. And I intend to spend all of 
today going through the basic history of that property. I 
will never refer to his religious beliefs. But I think 
it's crucial to show the jury what happened for almost 15 
years with respect to this property. It just didn't occur 
on 9/9 of '99 that four law enforcement officers went out 
there to chuck him off the property. 
THE COURT: There is language in the brief filed 
by Mr. Brass, which I thought -- let me see if I can find 
it quick. 
MR. BURNS: Are you just talking about referring 
to his religious tenets? 
MR. BRASS: No. How it's interwoven with all the 
tax problems, you know. Because it really is. I mean, 
that's what Leo testified about at the prelim is how 
adamant they were that they were a religion and didn't need 
to be bound by any of these procedures to perfect 
tax-exempt status and, in fact, refused to even attend 
meetings in that respect. 
MR. BURNS: And I intend to put all of that on, 
Your Honor. But I'm not going to believe what they believe 
and don't believe. I think I am entitled to show that they 
refused to pay taxes and that's why they lost the property. 
THE COURT: Mr. Brass has quoted a Delaware case, 
Dawson vs. Delaware, which includes this language, "but the 
inference which the jury was invited to draw in that case 
tended to prove nothing more than abstract beliefs on the 
Delaware chapter of the Arian Brotherhood. Whatever label 
is given to the evidence presented, however, we conclude 
that Dawson's first amendment rights were violated by the 
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1 admission of the Arian Brotherhood evidence in this case, 
2 because the evidence proved nothing more than Dawson's 
3 abstract beliefs." Then this language. "The government 
4 may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
5'* it so finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. 
6 Delaware might have avoided this problem if it had 
7 presented evidence showing more than mere abstract beliefs 
8 on Dawson's part." 
9 Mr. Hamilton's beliefs, his religious beliefs, I 
10 would not consider relevant, but acting out upon beliefs, 
11 the actual conduct which laid a foundation for what 
12 ultimately happened, seems to be, maybe, relevant. 
13 Now, Mr. Brass, does that coincide at all with --
14 MR. BRASS: Relevance, though, Judge, is what I am 
15 concerned about. See, this aptly summed it up earlier 
16 about what this case is all about. Was the officer's 
17 actions reasonable, or were the officers actions --
18 Mr. Hamilton's responses to those actions, were they 
19 reasonable. If we get to the point where you are giving 
20 instructions about self-defense and it requires the jurors 
21 to put themselves, to some extent, in Mr. Hamilton's shoes, 
22 then assess him by a reasonable man standard, just because 
23 this is what's prejudicial about this stuff, and why it 
24 really doesn't matter about as far as how this case turns 
25 out, goes, we are going to hear about 15 years worth of 
history about he's been in contention with Beaver County 
over whether he needs to pay taxes for this property and 
whether he continued to own it after they had a tax sale 
and all that sort of business. That's what today is going 
to take place. How is that going to help, in any respect, 
a jury assess whether or not when a person shot at his 
truck, then he drove off and got out of the car, shot the 
dog? And even if they find him guilty of a Class A 
Misdemeanor, last time I understood it, the death penalty 
wasn't the penalty for a Class A Misdemeanor. Then the 
officer announces his intention to kill him. A gun battle 
ensues. How does all this business about 15 years of tax 
dispute going to assess whether or not he acted as a 
reasonable man would act under those circumstances? See 
what I am worried about is, they will think because he's 
different than most people who were sitting in that jury 
room, most of the people in this room, really, that he's, 
per say, an unreasonable person. And that's my concern. 
THE COURT: Yeah. And I understand. I am 
sympathetic to that. And when I wrote -- I wrote each of 
you a letter, that joint letter, I said -- I asked you to 
both consider what kind of instruction I should give the 
religious defendant, or political philosophy. It will be 
difficult to avoid some evidence in that area. I was 
really suggesting an instruction, a defense instruction. 
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If there is some way that I can instruct that jury that 
does what you want them, which is, don't judge this man as 
unreasonable per say because of his religious views, or 
don't draw these adverse conclusions or presumptions 
because of his religious views, I'm willing to give you an 
instruction. 
MR. BRASS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Now, what relevance all this history^ 
has, if it's relevant, here's where it will be relevant. 
Chambers has the initial contact with the defendant in his 
pickup. He doesn't stop. And that sets in motion all this 
stuff that happens. And you are trying to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the officer's -- what the officer did, 
why he did it. And then the defendant's response, how 
reasonable was the defendant's response. Those acts were 
not done in a vacuum. Those acts had some history. Now, 
I --
MR. BRASS: But the history is legal contention. 
At least one of these other officers is going to testify, 
assuming he testifies consistently with what he said at the 
preliminary hearing, that he was shocked when he heard 
gunfire. That he never knew Mr. Hamilton ever, in all the 
years he had known him, to be a violent person at all, that 
the only physical act of resistance that he had ever shown 
was in his prior conviction for trespassing, and either 
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interfering or resisting, I can't remember which it is, 
where he holds to a stove pipe inside of one of these 
dwellings on this property. And they have to pry him loose 
as they carry him off, which is more akin to 60's civil 
rights passive resistance. There is not going to be any 
eviden'ce anywhere that he ever pointed a gun at anyone. 
That he ever threatened anyone with a firearm. Tn fact, 
this same fellow testified at the preliminary hearing, you 
might recall, that he thought that he was respectful 
towards law enforcement. So how does the fact that he's in 
contention with the government have anything to do with 
this, with what the issues are here? I mean, sure he's in 
contention with the government if he's on trial. Where 
being contention with the government, it all comes in. 
MR. BURNS: If I could speak very briefly, Your 
Honor. I don't know how I can try this case without 
showing the jury the basis of the reason for why the 
participants acted as they did on that day. Because I 
agree with what you have said. And I think Mr. Brass will 
agree with me \, that I think the construction 
is the reasonableness of the 
that 
that 
day. 
THE 
MR. 
actions 
COURT: 
BURNS: 
cannot 
On both 
On both 
action 
sides. 
sides. 
be covered up. 
of the 
And I 
of this case 
participants on 
also 
They not 
believe 
only did these 
1 acts, but they recorded them with the Beaver County 
2 recorder. How can you go in and record their uniform taxes 
3 and record these declarations and notice and record all of 
4 these things as public documents and then come to a court 
5 of law and say, but we don't want anybody to know about 
6 that. I think that is preposterous. They certainly wanted 
7 the world to know about them. 
8 MR. BRASS: Because now we are in a different 
9 venue. That's the reason that now we are in a venue where 
10 the charge is not, I'm an annoying sort of pro se litigant, 
11 we are here to decide whether he's guilty of attempted 
12 capital homicide. I don't think that his background, as 
13 far as that goes, the fact that he's been litigious over 
14 this property. 
15 MR. BURNS: Your Honor, one of the elements I have 
16 to prove is his attempt to kill them was because they were 
17 trying to arrest him, or the reason he tried to kill them 
18 because they were in their capacity as law enforcement and, 
19 gee, why would he try and do that? Well, I don't know. 
2 0 Well, I do. And I'll tell you why for 15 years. He 
21 doesn't believe in having a driver's license. He doesn't 
22 believe in taxes. He doesn't believe that Beaver County 
23 authorities have any power over him. That's why he had the 
24 intent to kill those two officers. Now, he recorded all of 
2 5 those things. I've got to prove that. If you take that 
all away, might as well be Oran Hatch standing out there, 
and 1 am trying to prove he had the intent to kill the 
officer. It's impossible. We wouldn't be here. 
THE COURT: This is a delicate balance, because I 
think the history has some relevance. But when Mr. Brass, 
when you outlined the counter-evidence, that the evidence 
that he was respectful, no prior showing of violence, et 
cetera --
MR, BRASS: Which has nothing to do with his 
religious beliefs or the tax problems. 
THE COURT: Right. But that suggests to us that 
we lay it out, and the jury's going to have to hear your 
arguments based on how you interpret that evidence. I 
don't want -- I don't want to try to paint a picture of 
violence based solely on the litigiousness, because they 
are not necessarily the same thing. But the litigiousness 
is relevant and germane why the officers were even there, 
why they had to deal with the issue in the first place of 
the trespass and all those things. So --
MR. BRASS: I agree with that. Don't get me 
wrong. I agree with what you just said. I think it's a 
matter of degree. Some of it I'm not smart enough to 
figure out how much. Okay? Some of it comes in to show 
what you've just shown. I mean, they didn't just show up 
there one day. I'm not going to claim that they went there 
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1 to do him in, you know, for no reason, that they didn't 
2 have any reason whatsoever under the sun to be there. So I 
3 think he's entitled to that. But, how far, you know? I 
4 mean, how far do we go? 
5 THE COURT: That's the issue. And we have talked 
6 enough about it so you both have a feel for how I feel 
7 about it. And I would rather you not make it too tough on 
8 me, that you try to be within that framework. If you try 
9 I to be fair, if the jury is going to have to wrestle with 
10 some things in this case --
11 MR. BRASS: No question. 
12 THE COURT: All right. Let's see. Did I go 
13 through all of them? 
14 I MR. BRASS: That's all of them. There is one 
15 other thing. 
16 THE COURT: The matter of the oath. 
17 MR. BRASS: That's very important. 
18 THE COURT: If I ask you, Mr. Hamilton, when you 
19 take the stand, my intent would be to advise you that you 
20 don't have to testify, that if you elect to testify, then 
21 you are subject to cross-examination, and you must 
22 understand that. I would ask you simply, do you know the 
2 3 difference between the truth and a lie? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Um-hmm. 
2 5 THE COURT: Are you prepared to affirm under oath 
---•. J. i-4. t_ 
^v-tO L. 
ruth? 
whole 
J truth and nothing but the truth? 
THE DEFENDANT: Under the penalties of perjury, I 
would not tell a lie. But my --
THE COURT: Is simply --
| MR. BRASS: Wait a minute. He wasn't done. I 
think he might have had some objection to that. 
THE DEFENDANT: Within the holy scriptures, 
Matthew 5 and 33, I shalt make all thine oaths to the Lord. 
MR. BRASS: So I think it's adequate, Judge, just 
to say to him that, Do you understand that you are bound to 
tell the truth under the penalties of perjury? 
THE COURT: Is that adequate? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's fair enough with me. 
THE COURT: I'll say that, and you say, yes, I 
understand. Will you promise to tell the truth? 
, THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I will. 
THE COURT: All right. That's good enough. 
MR. BRASS: There is two other witnesses that 
apply. I think it's his first two. 
MR. BURNS: Are they here? 
MR. BRASS: I thought I saw Talmage. 
THE COURT: I would rather you tell me who they 
are. I think it will be better for them and better for all 
of us if you alert me, and I can simply say, do you promise 
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1 to tell the truth. 
2 I MR. BURNS: Judge, I didn't get that motion until 
3 probably Saturday, so 1 haven't looked at that. 
4 THE COURT: Well, it's just --
5 MR. BURNS: I understand. But could we - - I mean, 
6 I is there some basis for this? 
7 THE COURT: There is. 
8 MR. BURNS: Okay. You don't have to say I swear 
9 to God? 
10 THE COURT: Courts have held that you have to have 
11 an affirmative expression of a promise to tell the truth. 
12 MR. BURNS: All right. 
13 THE COURT: And but I would rather -- I would 
14 rather ask them if they promise to tell the truth. They 
15 understand the difference between the truth and a lie and 
16 they promise to tell the truth. 
17 MR. BURNS: You just don't want it to come up so 
18 it looks like in front of the jury that they are different. 
19 MR. BRASS: Different, yeah. 
2 0 THE COURT: And I think they will do themselves a 
21 disservice, and even you will do yourself a disservice if 
22 you quote Matthew, not that these people don't believe in 
23 Matthew. 
24 MR. BURNS: Go ahead. 
2 5 THE COURT: It just sorts you out, and it will 
1 make you --
2 THE DEFENDANT: I just said that through the 
3 convenience here. 
4 MR. BRASS: You can add under penalties of 
5 perjury, I think being that's what the case law talks about 
6 as long as they understand. It's almost like qualifying a 
7 child as a witness, really; you know, the difference 
8 between right and wrong, the truth and a lie. 
9 THE COURT: Right. I'll do that that way. You 
10 alert me to the other witnesses. 
11 MR. BRASS: Okay. It will be the first couple on 
12 his list. 
13 THE COURT: Anything else we need to deal with 
14 before we go out and --
15 MR. BRASS: What's our schedule going to be? 
16 THE COURT: My schedule will be nine to five, at 
17 least one break in the morning, one break in the afternoon. 
18 We'll recess for lunch between 12 and 12:30, depending on 
19 where we are with the witness. And we will break -- if we 
2 0 recess at 12, we'll reconvene at 1:30. If we recess at 
21 12:30, we'll reconvene at two. 
22 MR. BRASS: Okay. Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: Anything else we need to deal with? 
24 MR. BURNS: Nothing from the state, Your Honor. 
25 MR. BRASS: Nothing from the defendant either. 
